Théorie politique

H19(d) - Governance and Responsibility in the Infosphere and Beyond

Date: Jun 5 | Heure: 01:45pm to 03:15pm | Salle: SJA-809

Chair/Président/Présidente : Victor Bruzzone (Pennsylvania State University)

Discussant/Commentateur/Commentatrice : Michael MacKenzie (Vancouver Island University)

Autocrats in Space. Or, How do you Occupy Mars?: Catherine Frost (McMaster University)
Abstract: Elon Musk has made it clear that he intends to “occupy Mars.” What if any law governs the founding of Mars settlements? Outer space does not fall under international law, which is an exclusively terrestrial jurisdiction, at least insofar as the establishment of new political communities is concerned, and effective jurisdiction is theoretically and practically limited to terra firma. The body of rules collectively known as “space law,” meanwhile, is embarrassingly thin, and largely amounts to two treaties (the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the Moon Treaty of 1979) with spotty global adherence (Paliouras 2014). Recent NASA-led initiatives like the Artemis Accords attempt to address questions around space settlements but fall well short of international consensus and may even be at odds with the original treaties (Tronchetti 2021). With leadership in space exploration shifting from public to private actors, the requirements for establishing legitimate off-world settlements have become increasingly unclear. One question posed by Musk’s ambition is whether a Mars settlement should be thought of as an offshore colony of existing nations or as an independently founded entity subject to its own governance with an inherent right to self-determination. Drawing on theories of statehood and self-determination, this paper examines ongoing efforts to develop standards for the political life of off-world populations. More specifically, it asks: if new settlements can make a credible claim to being autonomous of prevailing legal orders, does this signal the rise of a sphere of political authority that functions, quite literally, beyond the reach of existing terrestrial powers?

What rights can be denied to felons?: Peter Lindsay (Georgia State University)
Abstract: Democracies commonly recognize that certain rights can be denied to individuals convicted of a felony offense. In the U.S., forty-eight states deny the incarcerated the right to vote, and only thirteen states restore that right upon release. In the rest, individuals have to wait until their parole or probation is over, or, in the case of eleven states, they may never get the right back, depending on their crime. Other examples of rights denials abound. Incarceration obviously denies any rights of mobility, and it is common that persons on parole and probation have limitations placed on travel. Incarcerated individuals also have only limited rights against search and seizure, and their rights to property are heavily circumscribed. While there exists in the United States no right to employment or housing, there do exist rights not to be discriminated against with respect to either, and these rights are heavily attenuated for many of those who have already served their prison sentence. This paper explores the justification for such rights denials. The analysis uses as its framework the common justifications for legal punishment: retributivism, deterrence, quarantine and rehabilitation. In each case I explore what the reasonable scope of punishment with respect to rights is. I will supplement this analysis with a few reflections based on eight years of teaching in Georgia’s maximum-security prisons and working with the state’s formerly incarcerated.

Collective Responsibility in the Infosphere: Greg Dinsmore (Université de l'Ontario français)
Abstract: This paper will explore how Hannah Arendt’s concept of collective responsibility can be applied to the digital realm. In her essays on Responsibility and Judgment, Arendt argued that collective responsibility arises not from individual actions but from our shared belonging and care for a shared world – a physical space in the world that is the conditions for our political lives. Her conception of collective responsibility provides an important challenge to the liberal view which derives all responsibility from the choices (real or imagined) of free individuals. The social transformations brought about by the rapid development of digital technologies – from smartphones to social media platforms to large language models raise additional difficulties in understanding issues around individual and collective responsibility. The philosopher Luciano Floridi has attempted to understand how responsibility should be reconceived as our social interactions are increasingly taking place within an ‘infosphere’. Though not addressing collective responsibility in the Arendtien sense, Floridi does examine how responsibility becomes increasingly complex and distributed in our increasingly information-based world. In this paper, I will use Floridi’s idea that the development of the infosphere to attempt to understand the effects of the digital transformation of our world in the Arendtian sense. I will argue that Arendt’s thought can give us some help in dealing with the challenges of anchoring responsibility in our shared digital world. By examining the infosphere as a potential "world" that requires collective care, this paper aims to reexamine how we think about responsibility within digitally mediated, networked spaces.