Canadian Politics

A04(a) - When Digital Elections Go Wrong: And How to Fix Them

Date: Jun 3 | Time: 01:45pm to 03:15pm | Location:

Chair/Président/Présidente : Helen Hayes (McGill University)

Discussant/Commentateur/Commentatrice : Scott Pruysers (Dalhousie University)

Discussant/Commentateur/Commentatrice : Veronica Kitchen (Waterloo University)

The goal of this panel is to obtain feedback on early chapters for a book on the ways that digital elections can go wrong and what we can do to mitigate risk and protect electoral integrity in the age of cyber elections. There are many potential benefits to election technologies: improved accessibility for voters, assuaging public health concerns at physical poll locations, increased turnout, and streamlined administration leading to faster vote counts and result reporting. For these new opportunities be realized, however, the full range of threats and risks must be explored. Our book explores the extent and degree of this risk through the lens of Canada’s elections. Working collaboratively across disciplines of political science and computer science, the chapters systematize what can go wrong with election technologies, document issues that have arisen, and outline a framework and strategies to mitigate risks. Panel papers explore current and potential risks of election technologies used in Canada: e-poll books, tabulators, and online voting. Drawing on survey data from Canadian administrators we also investigate perceptions about risk exposure and thoughts on strategies to safeguard digital elections. Overall, we answer questions such as: What election technologies are used in Canada and why? What risks do they pose? How does risk exposure (actual and perceived) differ based on the type of technology being used? What types of technical incidents have occurred in elections in Canada? What are the gaps in both technology security and government protocols and processes administering these technologies? What can be done to mitigate technical incidents and lower risk exposure? Can the future of elections can be both digital and safe? Chapters provide scholars, practitioners, policymakers, private sector, and public audiences with a synthesis of the risks election technologies pose and what we can do to secure Canada’s elections.

Digital Elections in Canada: Nicole Goodman (Brock University), Holly Ann Garnett (RMC), Aleksander Essex (Western University)
Abstract: This introductory chapter provides an overview of the history and development of digital elections in Canada. It discusses why governments have modernized their elections with technology focusing on the narrative of technological solutionism as a strategy to counter electoral issues and ills. The chapter further outlines and defines the types of technologies governments have adopted as part of electoral modernization with a specific focus on online voting, tabulators, and electronic poll books – the types of election technologies most popularly used in Canadian elections – explaining their purposes, benefits, and potential perils. The chapter also distinguishes Canada as a unique research case - pointing to the high proportion of technical incidents and continuation of use. When digital elections fail in other countries, pilots or programs are halted or suspended indefinitely, while in Canada digital elections continue and expand. Finally, the chapter discusses the governance of election technologies in Canada, pointing to gaps in how we are regulating and governing digital elections. Overall, the chapter outlines the makings of a perfect storm for democratic disaster with the very high level of use among subnational governments, risk exposure across popularly used technologies, minimal government intervention and significant gaps in current policies and regulation. The book offers solutions to these problems in later chapters.

What Can Go Wrong with Digital Elections?: Aleksander Essex (Western University), Nicole Goodman (Brock University), Holly Ann Garnett (RMC)
Abstract: This chapter provides a cyber threat assessment of what can go wrong with digital elections focusing on e-poll books, tabulators, and online voting. Drawing on computer science theories and literature, several reviews of threats to elections in the past decade, and based on a technical review of online voting vendors’ systems it answers questions such as: What are current and future risks election technologies pose? How does risk exposure differ based on the type of technology being used? It also considers evolutions in the technologies looking at new and current technologies that are available such as blockchain and end-to-end verification and whether they serve to mitigate some of the threats. Risks are organized and classified based on their having a low, medium, or high threat to the election and its outcomes. The chapter concludes with an overarching sense of the potential magnitude of the current and future risks election technologies pose in binding public elections in Canada and the implications for electoral integrity.

What Has Gone Wrong with Digital Elections?: Nicole Goodman (Brock University), Aleksander Essex (Western University), Holly Ann Garnett (RMC)
Abstract: This chapter explores what has gone wrong with the deployment of election technologies in Canadian elections. The primary data informing the chapter is a repository of technical incidents across e-poll books, tabulators, and online voting collected from interviews, consultations with technology providers, and a review of news media articles dating back to 2010. Data on technical incidents has been notoriously difficult to obtain since issues are often not disclosed publicly unless they openly affect voting. Reflecting on what can go wrong with digital elections in the previous chapter, this paper illustrates what is actually happening when digital elections in Canada go wrong. Our results show that most technical incidents over the past 15 years are the result of either human error or limitations in bandwidth or connectivity that led to service outages. Most of the incidents that plague our digital elections and impact electoral integrity can be corrected with proper protocols, improved policies, and checks to reduce human error. While larger threats are possible, they are not the ones being realized in our elections.

Administrator Perceptions & Solutions: Holly Ann Garnett (RMC), Nicole Goodman (Brock University), Aleksander Essex (Western University)
Abstract: This chapter considers administrator opinions of the risks that election technologies pose, evaluating whether there is a difference between perception and reality based on our earlier analysis of the actual risks to deploying e-poll books, tabulators, and online voting. Drawing on survey data from municipal and provincial elections administrators from across Canada we examine the perceived risks of e-poll books, tabulators, and online voting in binding sub-national elections. We also probe respondent perceptions of technical incidents and appropriate responses. Finally, we consider administrators’ thoughts regarding solutions to maintain electoral integrity in the digital age. Can a digital election be a safe one? Which specific strategies do administrators perceive as mitigating risk exposure? Our analysis is organized according to three considerations: the level of government of the administrator, whether they have experience deploying election technologies, and whether their government or election agency has been affected by a technical or cyber incident.