Comparative Politics

B04 - Governing Styles and Institutional Dynamics

Date: Jun 3 | Time: 01:45pm to 03:15pm | Location:

Chair/Président/Présidente : Julien Robin (Université de Montréal)

Discussant/Commentateur/Commentatrice : Emily Dunlop (Cornell University)

Determinants of Prime Ministerial Governing Styles: Gala Palavicini (University of Alberta), Alex Marland (Acadia University), Eoin O'Malley (Dublin City University)
Abstract: Prime ministers exhibit contrasting governing styles, sometimes categorized as either “collegial” or “dominant.” Collegial prime ministers are characterized by their collaborative approach with ministers, fostering respect and teamwork, while dominant prime ministers exert control over their cabinets, often relying on unilateral decision-making. Despite this theoretical distinction, empirical research remains limited, leaving open questions about whether this personal distinction actually exists and if it does, what determines a prime minister’s governing style. This paper reports results from an expert survey conducted across 21 parliamentary democracies, covering prime ministers from circa 2000 to 2023. We empirically assess the influence of various factors on governing style, particularly the role of institutional conditions, including levels of party discipline and the nature of government, whether single-party or multi-party coalition. We also consider the impact of gender norms; previous studies suggest that gender may shape perceptions of leadership, with more dominant governing styles often associated with male prime ministers and more collaborative styles with female prime ministers.

Député ou groupe ? Redistribution des pouvoirs à l’Assemblée nationale (1910-2019): Julien Robin (Université de Montréal), Jean-François Godbout (Université de Montréal)
Abstract: Les élections législatives françaises anticipées de juillet 2024 ont abouti à la présence de 11 groupes parlementaires à l’Assemblée nationale, un record depuis 1958. Bien que la fragmentation du système partisan français (Jérôme, Mongrain et Nadeau 2022) en soit la principale explication, la culture politique (Manin 1999) et le mode de scrutin incitent pourtant les députés à cultiver le vote personnel (Blais et Loewen 2009). Cependant, les réformes au sein de l’Assemblée ont centralisé les ressources législatives – comme le contrôle de l’agenda et le temps de parole – au profit des groupes parlementaires. Cette communication examine l’évolution de l’organisation législative et la distribution des ressources entre le député individuel et le groupe parlementaire, pour déterminer si l’Assemblée s’est transformée en un « parlement de groupe ». La méthodologie repose sur le codage des règles parlementaires, attribuant les ressources aux députés ou aux groupes selon leurs fonctions (législative, organisationnelle, contrôle et électorale) sur la période de 1910 à 2019. Les résultats révèlent une augmentation de l’influence des groupes, leur part dans la distribution des ressources passant de 3,2 % en 1910 à 60,3 % en 2019. En mobilisant une approche néo-institutionnaliste, cette étude analyse comment ces réformes renforcent les groupes en tant qu’acteurs rationnels et stratégiques au sein de l’Assemblée. Ce cadre théorique permet de renouveler la compréhension de l’organisation législative en France, contribuant aux débats sur l’institutionnalisation des groupes (Schindler et Kannenberg 2024) et alignant l’analyse sur les travaux de Müller et Sieberer (2014) sur le changement institutionnel des parlements européens.

No Confidence in Non-Confidence Votes. (Or Less than in Confidence Votes): Elsa Piersig (Lakehead University)
Abstract: Parliamentary systems are defined by the responsibility of the prime minister and cabinet to parliament (Lijphart, 2012; Laver, 2006). There are two mechanisms for holding government accountable: non-confidence votes whereby parliamentarians move a motion declaring that cabinet has lost the confidence of the legislatures and confidence votes that allow the cabinet to ask parliamentarians for a vote of confidence, perhaps in relation to a policy item central to the government’s agenda (Strøm et al., 2003). Leaving aside the fact that parliament has to wait for governments to introduce a motion of confidence, it is reasonable to expect that parliament has an equal opportunity to hold the government to account and defeat it on either a non-confidence or confidence vote. Is this the case? The literature on confidence votes (Huber, 1996) and non-confidence votes (De Winter, 1995; Diermeier and Fedderson, 1998; Lento and Hazan, 2022) remains underdeveloped. Moreover, as the literature primarily studies each mechanism in isolation, there is rarely any examination of how the two mechanisms comparatively stack up – even when addressing both mechanisms (Bergman et al., 2003). This paper investigates whether the de jure constitutional and parliamentary rules governing the use of the two mechanisms afford parliaments the same level of selectoral power. That is, whether parliaments have the same ability to defeat the government and control their own fate following the loss of confidence on both non-confidence and confidence votes. Drawing on a sample of 28 European and Anglosphere parliamentary democracies, this paper shows that parliaments typically have more selectoral power on confidence votes compared to non-confidence votes, due in large part to the greater number of rules governing non-confidence rules.

Connecting The Dots Between Selection Mechanism, Trust And Success: Deliberative Minipublics As An Exercise Of Popular Constitutionalism: Günel Rzayeva (Memorial University)
Abstract: A significant portion of the global population lives under constitutions made long before their birth, authored by a select few without their direct consent. Yet, when an opportunity arises, how can ordinary citizens be included in constitution-making? Increasingly, politicians and populist leaders have called for the general public to play a greater role in passing constitutional reforms through referendums — voting on legislation proposed by their elected representatives. However, the past two decades also show the possibility of even more direct inclusion of citizens in constitution-making processes, from proposing constitutional amendments to redrafting a new constitution through deliberative minipublics. In this paper, I explore the “deliberative turn” in popular constitutionalism and its implications for democratic institutional design, focussing especially on the relationship between inclusionary design and the successful passage of reforms. I analyse three prominent recent cases: Iceland’s Constitutional Convention (2011-2013), Ireland’s Convention on the Constitution (2012-2014) together with the Irish Citizens’ Assembly (2016-2018), and the Chilean Constitutional Convention (2019-2022) and Council (2023). All three cases are characterised by deliberation and varying selection mechanisms and outcomes. The findings demonstrate that deliberative minipublics, convened through stratified random selection, can effectively take up the role of trusted information and judgement proxy for a successful constitution-making process. Nevertheless, I conclude, the success of deliberative minipublics tasked with reforming or redrafting a constitution is not constrained to obtaining public trust, but also the trust of traditional political institutions and political elites.