Comparative Politics

B13(a) - Propaganda, Opposition, and Cooptation in Contemporary Authoritarian Regimes

Date: Jun 4 | Time: 01:45pm to 03:15pm | Location:

Chair/Président/Présidente : Muhammad Bilal Shakir (McGill University)

Discussant/Commentateur/Commentatrice : Selin Bengi Gumrukcu (Rutgers New Brunswick)

Up against the Wall: An Empirical Study on the Ideology and Propaganda of Contemporary China: Rui Tang (University of Toronto)
Abstract: During the decade of the so-called “New Era” rules, the propaganda institution of the Chinese Communist Party encountered problems. Namely, the ineffectiveness of the party’s propaganda machines caused by the lack of theory innovation and discourse capabilities, the traditionalist trends deviating from the orthodox principles, and the abuse of hyping and anecdotal narratives in its media campaigns have resulted in multiple flawed ca mpaigns and eroded its credibility and ideological legitimacy. The problems came from the unresponsiveness of the party-state authorities due to the destruction of institutionalization, the party’s appeals to the conservative and nationalist sentiments among the society to sever its own needs and demands, and the overwhelmingly utilitarian beliefs of the propaganda machines led by its eagerness to restore its authority and influence to the public. These perils reflect not only the degeneration of China’s public discussion atmosphere but also the vulgarization of propaganda, and how the CCP is managing to adapt to the contemporary society of China.

Social Mobility, Authoritarian Regime Survival, and Transition to Democracy: Christian Houle (Michigan State University)
Abstract: How does social mobility affect stability in authoritarian regimes? While extensive literature examines how economic inequality influences regime stability and regime transition, there has been little work on the effect of social mobility. However, although related, inequality and social mobility are fundamentally distinct, and social immobility is likely to be perceived as even more unfair than inequality, meaning that it may generate more discontent. This paper fills this gap and argues that social mobility has different effects on different types of regime transitions. The key is distinguishing between transitions initiated by the autocratic elites and those triggered by outside actors. On the one hand, transitions to democracy initiated by the ruling elites are more likely to occur at high mobility levels. Mobility reduces the demand for redistribution from the poor, making democracy less threatening for the elites. On the other hand, the lack of mobility in an authoritarian regime increases the likelihood of instability, such as protests, and can lead to its collapse, potentially opening the door to democratization. Mobility thus has opposite effects on different types of transitions. I find support for the argument using several mobility measures and a sample covering over 90 autocracies between 1960 and 2015. Heckman selection models show that mobility stabilizes autocracies. However, mobility fosters transitions to democracy in the absence of an authoritarian breakdown. I further conduct a causal mediation analysis and, consistent with the argument, find that mobility fosters authoritarian breakdown through its effect on mobilization and unrest.

Beyond the Ballot: Opposition Party Tactics under Competitive Authoritarian Regimes: Selin Bengi Gumrukcu (Rutgers)
Abstract: The third global wave of autocratization has triggered widespread democratic backsliding across numerous regions, including Turkey. While most scholarship has focused on the strategies incumbents use to gain or maintain power in autocratizing regimes, a growing body of recent analysis has shifted its attention to the opposition. Dahl (1966: 333) argued that “a political party is the most visible manifestation and surely one of the most effective forms of opposition in a democratic country.” While there is an established tradition of examining competitive authoritarian regimes through a party-focused lens (Helms 2023: 399), this scholarship primarily concentrates on institutional tactics, such as coalition-building (Gandi and Reuter 2013; Selçuk and Hekimci 2020; Baskan et al. 2022), legislative resistance (Lastro and Bieber 2021), and election boycotts (Hauser 2019). What is often missing in this literature is an exploration of other protest tactics employed by opposition parties. This paper addresses this gap by examining the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), since 2002. Using process tracing and semi-structured in-depth interviews, the study aims to illuminate how Turkish opposition parties’ diverse tactics have both challenged and navigated the constraints of an increasingly authoritarian system. Through a detailed examination of these dynamics, the paper highlights the possibilities and limitations of opposition-led resistance in autocratizing regimes. It argues that shifts in an opposition party's mobilization tactics can be explained by (a) changes in the party structure and style, (b) the political opportunity structure, and (c) the dynamics of repression within a competitive authoritarian regime.

Incorporation without Neutralization: Unpacking the Logic of Cooptation and Authoritarian Survival: Juan Wang (McGill University)
Abstract: For studies of comparative authoritarianism, cooptation has been understood as one important mechanism through which autocrats incorporate opposition and neutralize threat. However, does incorporation always leads to neutralization of threat? This paper unpacks the logic of this reasoning that relies on multiple assumptions about the relationship among the power holder, the incorporated, and the rest of “potential threats.” Building on the case of incorporating private entrepreneurs in governing and political institutions in the People’s Republic of China since 1949, the paper suggests that first, those being incorporated are either friendly to the power center or self-selected to share rents. Second, potential threats are quickly excluded from rent and power sharing. Third, the incorporated do not represent private entrepreneurs. In the end, incorporation does not lead to neutralization but reshapes the division among the private sector and creates fragmentation.