Political Theory

H05(a) - Belonging and Identity in Political Theory

Date: Jun 3 | Time: 03:30pm to 05:00pm | Location:

Chair/Président/Présidente : Antonin Lacelle-Webster (Yale University)

Discussant/Commentateur/Commentatrice : Antonin Lacelle-Webster (Yale University)

A Phenomenology of Belonging: Laila Khoshkar (University of Toronto)
Abstract: Newcomers to Canada, particularly resettled refugees, are entitled to a wide set of civic rights, by virtue of their legal status as permanent residents. Yet, many resettled refugees do not experience their rights in Canada meaningfully. I contend that a meaningful experience of one’s rights requires two, necessary conditions: legal status and belonging. In this paper, I articulate a phenomenology of belonging, in order to draw attention to the ways in which we, as a larger community, are implicated in newcomers’ experiences of their rights. Following the dominant distinction in the literature on belonging, I analyse belonging as a bifurcated concept. Horizontal belonging indicates a harmonious relationship with others in one’s social surroundings; vertical belonging points to a harmonious relationship with the institutions governing one’s life. I develop two main claims in this paper: first, I argue that belonging along both planes is a fundamentally intersubjective activity. In order to better illustrate this intersubjectivity, I draw on the literature on recognition. I draw parallels between the horizontal dimension of belonging and social recognition, as well as between vertical belonging and institutional recognition. Second, I argue that social and institutional belonging are not distinct categories, in individuals’ lived experiences. Rather, the social and institutional dimensions interact with one another, to condition the possibility for experiencing belonging. Ultimately, this interaction shapes the possibility for a meaningful experience of one’s rights.

Who Belongs in Politics? Emotional Inclusion and Exclusion as a Mechanism of Belonging: Veronika Reichert (University of Alberta)
Abstract: Emotionality (the sentimentalism prior the French Revolution; the moral sense of Shaftesbury, Hutchison, and Smith) and rationality (Enlightenment project of annulling rule by domination in favour of rule of rational law) have both contributed to the configuration of liberal thought and institutions, and specifically have been a parameter which defines political belonging or exclusion. The emotional has been a label frequently placed on those who were to be barred from political participation, who for their emotionality—as attached to other markers of identity and status (race, class, gender, sexuality)—were deemed unfit for politics, not adequately being able to represent, contribute to, or have a stake in the political community. This emotionality—the inverse of the more pertinent lack of reason—was largely a post-hoc descriptor for those meant to be excluded. In recent years, many projects of political theory endeavour to bring the emotions into politics. However, caution is required when examining emotionally-inclusive political projects. While there is a persistent narrative that emotions have long been excluded from politics, and are finally being considered properly, we must pay attention to the way that projects aiming to include the emotions define that inclusion. What emotions are fit, or unfit, for politics, and who exhibits those emotions? Which political communities are wholesome and compassionate, thus exemplar for the political order, and which are need of emotional-political reform? In essence, how are positive appraisals of political emotions being used to define who and what belongs, or doesn’t belong, to liberal political societies?

A New Politics of Belonging: The Games of Opacity and Revelation in the Struggle for Recognition: Justine Perron (Université d'Ottawa), Sophie Bourgault (Université d'Ottawa)
Abstract: To transform recognition dynamics in contemporary societies, Judith Butler (2015) proposes a theory of plural performativity based on the right to appear. This right involves a practice of freedom aimed at critiquing and transforming the norms of recognizability that limit some groups’ access to recognition. By exploiting the contradictions within the field of appearance, those whose lives are not accounted for (or deemed ungrievable) can shift recognizability’s norms by assembling in public spaces. But Butler also observes that “Sometimes political action is more effective when launched from the shadows or the margins” (Butler 2015, p. 55). In a world where (hyper)visibility can serve as a tool of power (Foucault 1975), we must consider alternative ways to transform recognition dynamics. Does resistance need to be recognizable to reshape the social world? How can we reconcile the right to appear with more discreet or even invisible forms of resistance? If Butlerian theory focuses on more “conventional” forms of protest, James C. Scott (1992) contends that true recognition (irretrievable by the system) and resistance can only occur among the dominated in private spaces hidden from power. This paper calls for a new politics of recognition that can join and disrupt the spheres of the visible and the invisible. To this effect, we bring together Butler's right to appear and Scott's infrapolitics in order to theorize an account of recognition located firmly at the intersection of the private and public, the extraordinary and ordinary, and revelation and opacity (Glissant 1997). We will also draw on contemporary examples of resistance to illustrate some of our claims (e.g. Bourcier 2019 on anonymous public performances; Malatino 2019 on an infrapolitics of care).

The problem of incommensurability in membership theory: Hazim Mohamed (University of Toronto), Matthew Walton (University of Toronto)
Abstract: Political theory is predicated on an ideal of justice and freedom that presupposes a people or community that is bounded in the sense of reflecting clear demarcations between citizens and non-citizens. When questions of belonging and togetherness are concerned, it is often assumed to relate to groups who are already citizens but continue to struggle with issues related to recognition, representation, or access to rights. Within this discourse, those who are not citizens are assumed to be recent immigrants, often present illegally, who must either be deported or naturalized in order to form a legitimate relationship to the state. Yet, in practice, this relationship already exists for many non-citizens who reside within the territory of the community for many generations and provide their labor to various sectors, from agriculture to domestic care. This paper explores the normative tensions that result from the claims of belonging that are raised not by those who are marginalized and excluded within the community, but by those who are not considered part of the community altogether despite the fact of their territorial presence. While this may be treated as a legal issue that concerns the attainment of citizenship rights for certain members of the community, I suggest that it points to a deeper ambiguity about the meaning of community if legal and national boundaries are less stable than is commonly assumed. To navigate these issues, I propose that we should understand political membership not as something that is present or absent based on one's legal status (whether or not they are a citizen), but as something that is perpetually plagued by what I call the problem of incommensurability, which can be described in the following way: the idea of citizenship involves the sharing of a political community, yet this ideal is frustrated by the fact that some people are already born with citizenship while others have to slowly but actively work their way toward it, thus creating an uneven playing field in which people are differently situated to contribute to sharing. Political theory attempts to close this gap by treating citizenship as an instrument of commensuration that creates the requisite conditions to practice sharing on equal terms. However, this creates multiple avenues for the abuse of prospective citizens that are widely documented by scholars of migration, who highlight the ways in which migrants can be kept in a state of legal limbo in which their condition is indefinitely delayed while their labor is exploited, but it also raises questions about the fairness of legitimizing this form of relating to political communities (through naturalization) while the other form (citizenship) is not held to the same standard or expectation. Even if citizens - for example, those who are born abroad - have no relationship to the community, they enjoy more rights and privileges than those who lack citizenship but have real, existing ties to the community. This, I argue, is normatively unjust, and must be reconciled by acknowledging the various and conflicting ways in which people come to relate to communities (through birthright, migration, colonialism, etc.), which are only becoming more complex and variegated due to globalization, transnationalism, and digital connectedness.