C04(a) - Peacebuilding 2: Actors & Interventions
Date: Jun 3 | Time: 01:45pm to 03:15pm | Location:
Chair/Président/Présidente : Jamie Levin (St. Francis Xavier University)
Militias as Tools of Politically Engaged Militaries: A Persistent Strategic Utility Rizwan Asghar, Trinity College Dublin Military Operations During Humanitarian Intervention: Strategy and Tactics in Operationalizing R2P Patrick Sauriol The Ties that Spoil: Explaining the Nexus Between Foreign Sponsorship and Insurgent Fragmentation Sanjida Amin, University of Toronto Mohammad Alam amin, South Asian University Post-Withdrawal Afghanistan: Taliban Rule and the International Community's Security Concerns
The Ties that Spoil: Explaining the nexus between foreign sponsorship and insurgent fragmentation: Sanjida Amin (University of Toronto), Jacques Bertrand (University of Toronto)
Abstract: Peace processes hold the promise of resolving civil conflicts but can paradoxically complicate matters by increasing the likelihood of fragmentation within insurgent groups. This article examines the influence of foreign sponsorship on insurgent fragmentation, specifically addressing the question: How does military support from a rival foreign state affect insurgent fragmentation during peace processes? Utilizing Putnam’s two-level game framework, I argue that the risk of fragmentation escalates when an insurgent leader struggles to balance internal faction dynamics with external relations with foreign sponsors. The theory is tested through a quantitative analysis of a dataset encompassing all civil wars fought between 1975 and 2011, alongside an in-depth case study of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army’s split in 1991. This paper offers both empirical and theoretical insights into the frequently overlooked role of external interference in civil wars, challenging the conventional wisdom that insurgent fragmentation is a matter of internal group dynamics. It highlights the strategic interactions between insurgent groups and foreign states, demonstrating their substantial impact on the trajectory of civil conflicts.
Military Operations During Humanitarian Intervention: Strategy and Tactics in Operationalizing R2P: Patrick Sauriol (McMaster University), Marshall Beier (McMaster University)
Abstract: Following the end of the Cold War, humanitarian intervention has increased both in its application and in its scholarly attention. Criticisms of humanitarian intervention vary from its co-optation by Western powers to justify neo-imperialism, to its ability to circumvent state sovereignty, and have valid evidence to back up said criticisms. However, there remains the issue of what to do about enforcing human rights law and ensuring that states cannot act with impunity when they engage in gross human rights violations. While there may never be a perfect way to invoke humanitarian intervention and enforce human rights law, this paper puts forward a framework for how humanitarian intervention can be better applied by examining an under researched and criticized aspect of interventions, the strategies and tactics used by intervening militaries. This paper uses examples from Libya, Rwanda, Somalia, Afghanistan, and the Balkans to argue that effective military operations to protect human rights require intelligence, local knowledge, and trust, which can be accumulated through proper cooperation. Drawing from the example of the Malayan Emergency, I argue that intervening states make the same mistake as the British, assuming that simple force can be used to end a crisis. Finally, I argue that a standing multinational force, trained and equipped to operate in a humanitarian context would be best suited to operationalize humanitarian intervention. A framework for humanitarian intervention based around local knowledge and systems of justice and reconciliation, while time consuming, will create more lasting peace, while restoring legitimacy to humanitarianism.
Post-Withdrawal Afghanistan: Taliban Rule and the International Community's Security Concerns: Mohammad Alam Amin (South Asian University)
Abstract: Afghanistan remained deprived of prosperity and political stability; this is due to the power struggles of superpowers. Afghanistan witnessed a foreign invasion in 2001 when the US led coalition force attacked it after the deadly terrorist attacks of 9/11. However, after staying almost for two decades, the US finally negotiated a peace deal with the Taliban. Following the withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan on August 15, 2021, and with the return of the Taliban, it is now said that Afghanistan is emerging as a safe base for Islamic State Khorasan (ISIS-K), posing a significant security threat, especially to the United States and its allies. The recent devastating ISIS-K attack in Moscow, resulting in 137 fatalities and 100 injuries, has given credence to the apprehension that Afghanistan may again emerge as a safe destination for international terrorism. However, the Taliban is committed to deal with the ISIS-K and claims that Afghanistan has achieved its greatest stability in four decades under its rule, asserting control over the entire nation and vowing to prevent any group from using its territory for hostile activities. This paper aims to examine whether Afghanistan, under Taliban governance, poses a genuine threat to the international community. Additionally, it will explore strategies to address the escalating threat posed by ISIS-K and look into the reasons for its presence in Afghanistan. At the end, a qualitative method of analysis (primary and secondary) sources and regional security complex theory will be used. The paper will contribute to the international security and terrorism studies, and it will also contribute to the existing scholarship on state and non-state actors in post-conflict regions.
Militias as Tools of Politically Engaged Militaries: A Persistent Strategic Utility: Rizwan Asghar (Trinity College Dublin)
Abstract: A growing body of scholarly research demonstrates that pro-government militias (PGMs) are frequently liked to increased repression of civilians, prolonged conflicts, and a higher likelihood of civil war recurrence. Despite these negative outcomes, the rationale behind some governments' decisions to fund PGMs to combat rebel groups remains inadequately understood. This paper explores the domestic determinants of funding PGMs in both civil war and non-civil war contexts, focusing on variation in civil-military relations. I argue that governments in countries with weak civilian control are more inclined to support PGMs in situations resembling civil wars. This is because the military in these countries seeks to avoid costly negotiated settlements that could threaten its institutional interests. On the other hand, in countries not experiencing civil wars, the military may employ PGMs to diminish the power of other political elites that could challenge its dominant role in the policymaking process. I test these arguments using data on PGMs for all countries from 1981 to 2014. I find robust statistical support for my arguments and these results are robust to variety of model specifications. I illustrate the causal mechanisms with a case study of Myanmar's military, which has repeatedly used militias for both counterinsurgency operations and the suppression of political opponents.