Political Behaviour/Sociology

F05(a) - Political Polarizations III: Who is Polarized?

Date: Jun 12 | Time: 03:30pm to 05:00pm | Location: UQAM, Pavillon Hubert-Aquin, 400 Ste-Catherine E., classroom/local A-5020

Chair/Président/Présidente : Fred Guillaume Dufour (Université du Québec à Montréal,)

Discussant/Commentateur/Commentatrice : Sophie Borwein (University of British Colombia)

Partisan Conformity and Political Intolerance: Seyoung Jung (Université du Québec à Montréal)
Abstract: As partisan prejudice increases, citizens show discriminating intolerance, opposing the rights of groups on the opposite side. Paying attention to partisan dynamics, this project examines how partisan identity and conformity shape political intolerance. I test whether a request for partisan conformity increases their willingness to act on political intolerance, using a vignette experiment where co-partisans ask to sign a petition to ban the protest of the least-liked group. Furthermore, I investigate which mechanism underlies this conformity, particularly comparing the narratives involving ingroup praise or outgroup derogation. Results indicate that co-partisans can influence other co-partisans to behave in a politically intolerant manner. While both types of narratives induced partisan conformity, more respondents opted for displaying their names in limiting others’ civil activities when a narrative blaming the outgroup was given as a reason for solidarity. The findings contribute to our understanding of attitudinal and behavioral changes when political intolerance meets polarization.

Évolution des croyances spirituelles au Québec suite à la COVID-19 : Une analyse de la théorie de la gestion de la terreur: Camille Pelletier (Université Laval), Laurence-Olivier M. Foisy (Université Laval)
Abstract: Cet article explore l'influence de la pandémie de COVID-19 sur les croyances spirituelles au Québec, à travers le prisme de la théorie de la gestion de la terreur. La pandémie, ayant imposé des restrictions sanitaires sévères et suscité une couverture médiatique alarmiste, a servi de catalyseur potentiel pour un renouveau spirituel en réponse à l'angoisse de mortalité. Cette étude analyse les modifications des croyances spirituelles postpandémiques des Québécois en utilisant des données comparatives issues de sondages pré et postpandémie. Les résultats dérivés d'un sondage initial en 2014 et d'un suivi postpandémique indiquent une augmentation notable de l'engagement spirituel parmi les répondants. Cette tendance est interprétée comme une tentative de donner un sens à la vie face à la crise sanitaire. L'étude a également incorporé une analyse de contenu des unes médiatiques à l'aide du langage de programmation "r" pour examiner l'impact de la représentation médiatique de la pandémie sur l'état d'anxiété et la recherche de significations spirituelles. L'article fournit une contribution significative à la littérature sur les mouvements spirituels en période de crise, en montrant une corrélation entre l'exposition à une pandémie et une orientation spirituelle accrue. Il met en lumière les réponses adaptatives des individus face à une prise de conscience de leur mortalité, enrichissant ainsi notre compréhension des dynamiques socioculturelles en temps de crise. Les implications de ces découvertes soulignent l'importance d'appréhender les dimensions psychologiques de la santé publique.

Who is Affectively Polarized? A Sociodemographic Insight: Juliette Leblanc (Western Ontario)
Abstract: The rise of partisanship as a social identity has sparked research into its consequences, particularly the increase in affective polarization, which measures individuals' affinity for their in-group and hostility toward their out-group (Iyengar et al., 2018). Many studies have explored how increasing affective polarization has implications in non-political areas, affecting relationships, attractiveness judgments, and job applications. While it's evident that people are becoming more affectively polarized, influencing even non-political judgments, we have yet to fully understand how non-political characteristics affect levels of affective polarization, especially in terms of sociodemographics. Who is affectively polarized? This study primarily focuses on identifying affectively polarized individuals within various sociodemographic groups. It examines whether gender, age, education, income, and region influence levels of affective polarization. Additionally, it explores when these social factors are most likely to impact individuals' levels of affective polarization, such as during relationship formation, which can be related to one's age, and parenthood. By analyzing social distance items and feelings thermometers, I will evaluate individuals displaying levels of affective polarization, altought not in terms of the strength of partisanship. These results will shed light on which sociodemographic factors might influence one's levels of affective polarization and whether specific life stages, like forming meaningful relationships, have an impact on how someone interacts with members of the other party and their own.

Chapter 3: Follow the Leader: Eric Merkley (University of Toronto)
Abstract: Prior research has found “sorting” in the Canadian electorate. Liberal/NDP and Conservative supporters have increasingly divergent views about policy. This sorting may be an important cause of affective polarization in Canada, but the causes of this sorting have not yet been studied. This chapter, from a book project exploring the causes and consequences of affective polarization in Canada, makes four contributions. First, I illustrate with Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) data that elite polarization in Canada is mostly characterized by a drift of the Liberal Party to the left on economic policy, and movement by the Conservatives to the socially conservative right. Second, I use data from the Canadian Election Study (CES) to show that perceptions elite polarization are consistently associated with partisan sorting, and that these perceptions lead rather than follow sorting. Third, I use multilevel modelling to show that elite polarization is associated with sorting. Finally, I use panel data from the CES to shed light on the mechanism begin sorting. We see, counter-intuitively, that we cannot discount the role of party-switchers in producing higher levels of sorting in the Canadian electorate. Taken together, the results suggest that partisan sorting, and potentially downstream affective polarization, have roots in elite discourse, but that Canadians don’t necessarily mechanically adopt the positions of their preferred party. Their partisan attachments can be shaped by their ideological and value commitments.