International Relations

C14(c) - Generating Environmental Effectiveness

Date: Jun 13 | Time: 03:30pm to 05:00pm | Location: McGill College 2001 461

Chair/Président/Présidente : Sam Rowan (Concordia University)

Discussant/Commentateur/Commentatrice : Michael Lipson (Concordia University)

Persuasion and United Nations Environmental Politics: Michael Manulak (Carleton University)
Abstract: As the international community relies increasingly on non-binding political commitments and communications technologies lead international actors to weave ever-denser webs of social interaction, the capacity to persuade in global affairs has never been more important. Yet, as Robert O. Keohane observes, persuasion remains a missing concept within International Relations theory. Drawing on literature on bounded rationality and cognitive psychology, this paper develops a model of persuasion. It uses insights on temporal factors in international affairs to shed light on how actor preferences can shift in response to persuasion attempts, demonstrating the role of “persuasion windows” and temporal satisficing in shaping preference formation and change. Using interviews and a detailed archival analysis, the plausibility of the model is probed through a qualitative case study analysis of a persuasion attempt by the secretary-general of the 1972 Stockholm Conference, Maurice Strong, toward Brazil. In addition to demonstrating the plausibility of the model, the case makes an important empirical contribution to understanding the history of UN environmental governance. Constructive Brazilian engagement at the UN conference paved the way to success in Stockholm, to the creation of UNEP, and to the subsequent sustainable development agenda.

A QCA Analysis of the Recipe for Effective Science-Policy Interplay in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Véronique Fournier (Université Laval)
Abstract: How are effective scientific recommendations produced in multilateral environmental agreements? Effectiveness refers to the level of uptake by MEAs’ decision-makers of the recommendations of their subsidiary scientific bodies. This paper examines how the management of the science-policy relationship by these scientific bodies within MEAs impacts their recommendations uptake. While International Relations literature suggests a separation of science and policy for consensus-building before advising decision-makers, Science and Technology Studies literature offers different insights. National case studies reveal that scientific advice is more influential when scientific bodies draw from diverse knowledge sources and regularly engage with decision-makers. This is contrasted with isolated scientific bodies who only communicate their final results. Factors like power imbalances among Member States and the subsidiary scientific body's mandate can also affect recommendation uptake. This article employs a qualitative comparative analysis to determine how the combinations of these factors impact the effectiveness of recommendations from 14 subsidiary scientific bodies in MEAs. For assessing varying levels of effectiveness, it builds on a questionnaire sent to the decision-makers about their perception of the scientific recommendations. These scientific bodies, as policy-prescriptive entities with direct access to international decision-makers, play a pivotal role in providing evidence-based policies for complex environmental issues. By understanding the factors behind effective scientific recommendations, this paper informs the design of these bodies within international organizations. This also contributes to better comprehend their role in effective MEAs implementation. This research enhances our knowledge of international institution design by incorporating insights from STS scholars regarding effective science-policy interplay.

Shared Understandings, Legitimacy and Legality: Ingredients to Norm Evolution and Diffusion: Laurie Durel (Université Laval)
Abstract: Extensive literature has studied the role of legitimacy in maintaining compliance with international organizations or international norms. Yet, little research has studied the role of legitimacy for the evolution of norms and shared understandings of legality. We combine this literature with the interactional international law framework that provides that the first step of the evolution of international norms can come from shared understandings among actors, which can influence norms’ legality and legitimacy. We apply a vector autoregression (VAR) approach to an original dataset covering the evolution of the debate on the legality of the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) between 2002 and 2021 in the European Union and the legal literature. We find that legal scholarship is particularly influenced by policymakers. In addition, we find strong support that a positive assessment of the legitimacy of the CBAM leads to a positive assessment of its legality. This paper opens a new methodological avenue to apply inferential analysis methods to international law. The results of this research are of interest to scholars looking at the evolution of international norms and institutions and the impact of legitimacy on this process.

Compliance with Climate Targets: Sam Rowan (Concordia University)
Abstract: Empirical research on international cooperation increasingly focuses on how international agreements change states’ behaviour rather than earlier questions about compliance. This turn, which is common across diverse issue areas such as finance and human rights, reflects supposedly fundamental theoretical problems with compliance as a concept and empirical problems with disentangling compliant behaviour from other country characteristics. However, developments in the design of international climate agreements provide innovations for re-examining compliance. I explain how climate mitigation targets present methodological advantages, such as providing clear indicators for compliance, prior trends, and observability. At the same time, these targets are also impacted by more general endogeneity and benchmarking issues. Empirically, I demonstrate that compliance to date with climate targets under the Paris Agreement is worse for countries with more ambitious targets. If governments ratchet their targets while failing to meet them, this could increase concerns about hypocrisy in climate politics.