Relations internationales

C17(c) - Canadian Foreign Policy

Date: Jun 5 | Heure: 10:15am to 11:45am | Salle:

Chair/Président/Présidente : Michael Murphy (Queen's University)

Discussant/Commentateur/Commentatrice : Leah Sarson (Dalhousie University)

Pearson, Suez, and the Rise and Fall of Canadian Peacekeeping Graeme Young, University of Glasgow Vancouver meets Pyongyang: Canada and the North Korean Crisis Daniel Jacinto, McGill University "So Basically We're F*ed": Challenges and Strategies for Canada in the (Second) Trump Era Brian Bow, Dalhousie University Developing an Effective Canadian Foreign Policy for an Evolving Multipolar World Ian Roberge, Glendon Campus, York University Jeremy Wildeman - Carleton University

Developing an Effective Canadian Foreign Policy for an Evolving Multipolar World: Ian Roberge (York University), Jeremy Wildeman (Carleton University)
Abstract: Canada needs a new foreign policy adapted to the realities of a rapidly changing multipolar world. Exactly what period constitutes the height of Canadian influence in world affairs can be debated, but what is clear is that Canada is no longer ‘punching above its weight’. Observers of Canadian foreign policy are now questioning the government’s approach to international diplomacy, the overall coherence of its foreign policy strategy and aims, and if it is even interested in developing an effective foreign policy. Using a historical institutionalist approach, we trace the evolution of Canadian foreign policy from a period of success starting in the late 1990s (e.g., the 1997 Ottawa Treaty). We ask how Canadian foreign policy has since evolved and what explains the government’s lacklustre performance in this policy field. In so doing, we make three interrelated claims. First, successive Canadian governments have been unable and unwilling to redefine Canada’s national interest, accounting for the evolution of the geopolitical order. Further, Canada’s self-perception as a benign middle power has long been irrelevant and contradictory to reality and its evolving policy needs. Second, foreign policy has been made based on domestic political and community electoral calculus at the expense of a coherent approach. Third, Canadian governments have not made foreign policy a priority and have shed the requisite capacity to act effectively on the world stage. We conclude by arguing that more than ever Canada needs to develop an interest-based foreign policy that properly positions it within an evolving world order.

Pearson, Suez, and the Rise and Fall of Canadian Peacekeeping: Graeme Young (University of Glasgow)
Abstract: Canadian contributions to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations have declined significantly since the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. An understanding of why this is the case would benefit from a historical reappraisal of why Canada became a major peacekeeping contributor in the preceding decades. This paper contributes to such a task by examining the key assumptions, principles, and motivations that influenced Lester B Pearson as he played a central role in crafting the UN’s response to the 1956 Suez Crisis and the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). Based on extensive archival research, it illustrates how Pearson’s approach to the Suez Crisis and the advent of UNEF sought to balance three defining axes of Canadian foreign policy: (1) a realist view of Great Power politics and a liberal view of the value of peace through multilateralism; (2) traditional ties to the United Kingdom as a member of the Commonwealth and growing integration with the United States as a dominant power in the bipolar postwar order; and (3) a strong Western ally in the Cold War and an active participant in international institutions increasingly shaped by decolonization. These efforts proved politically controversial in Canadian domestic politics, but nevertheless established a durable settlement that allowed Canada to play a major role in UN peacekeeping for most of the remainder of the twentieth century. This settlement has since fallen apart and Canadian participation in UN peacekeeping operations has collapsed.

Vancouver meets Pyongyang: Canada and the North Korean Crisis: Daniel Jacinto (McGill University), Fernando G. Nuñez-Mietz (McGill University)
Abstract: The North Korean nuclear and missile crisis has been a longstanding challenge for East Asian international relations. The crisis has drawn international condemnation since early threats in 1993 to withdraw from the NPT, through to the present day where the country has undertaken six nuclear tests and claims possession of both nuclear weapons and an array of delivery systems. The primary players in mitigating the crisis have typically been the country’s regional neighbours of South Korea and Japan, as well as global powers like the US, China, and Russia. However, what role, if any, do outside actors have in the crisis? The paper approaches this question through the case study of Canada’s co-hosting of the 2018 Vancouver Foreign Minister’s Meeting on Security and Stability on the Korean Peninsula. Drawing on primary government records obtained through an Access to Information request, the paper aims to tackle two parallel insights from this event. On the Canadian side, it asks: why Canada? What roles does it have in the crisis? What objectives did it hold, and how does this align with broader Canadian foreign policy concerns? On the more regional question, the paper investigates: what space is there for outside actors—especially middle powers—both in the North Korean nuclear issue, and in terms of East Asian security as a whole? Together, the paper yields empirical insights for the study of Canadian foreign policy and Asia-Pacific international relations, as well as theoretical insights for IR in terms of trans-regional and middle-power diplomacy.

"So Basically We're F*ed": Challenges and Strategies for Canada in the (Second) Trump Era: Brian Bow (Dalhousie University)
Abstract: Donald Trump's election in 2016 sent shockwaves through Ottawa and other OECD capitals, as policy-makers struggled to adapt to Trump's personalistic approach to politics and his "America First" agenda. In anticipation of Trump's demand for a renegotiation of NAFTA and other potential disruptions, the Trudeau government rolled out a "Team Canada" strategy for bilateral engagement, which built on lessons learned during previous diplomatic emergencies in the 1980s and early 2000s. The government is busy re-activating that improvised diplomatic machinery again now, and if it loses the next election, the successor government will presumably have to work out its own way of coping with Trump. The old Team Canada model had serious limitations, and it is likely to be even less reliable this time around, because the circumstances surrounding Trump's 2024 election mean that there will be virtually no "guardrails" to limit his autocratic and unilateral impulses. This paper will mostly be focused on plumbing the depths of the diplomatic disaster facing Canada today, but it will also offer a few suggestions for specific adjustments that might take the edge off in some policy areas.