Relations internationales

C16(c) - IR Theory 3: Realism

Date: Jun 5 | Heure: 08:30am to 10:00am | Salle:

Chair/Président/Présidente : Brian Bow (Dalhousie University)

Discussant/Commentateur/Commentatrice : Justin Massie (UQAM)

Is Side-picking Inevitably An Unwise Choice？A Study of Middle Power‘s Strategy in Great Power Competition Yanzhuo Xu, Chinese Academy of Social Science Realism and Neutrality in Fragile States Foreign Policy S. Yaqub Ibrahimi, Carleton University Nuclear War and the Limits of Prudence Christopher LaRoche, Central European University Neoclassical Realism, Policy Paradigm Shift, and the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis Revisited Ronaldo Au-Yeung, University of Notre Dame

Neoclassical Realism, Policy Paradigm Shift, and the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis Revisited: Ronaldo Au-Yeung (University of Notre Dame), Victoria Hui (University of Notre Dame)
Abstract: The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis remains the most war-like confrontation between Beijing and Washington since the 1960s. Existing studies of the standoff, which have predominantly relied on domestic instability, strategic deterrence, and nationalism, are problematic, because they all assume a linear escalatory behavior of Beijing. However, China started with a rather accommodative posture, which only later became more hostile toward Washington. How can we explain this two-step crisis behavior? Within the “Type I” neoclassical realist framework, the present paper borrows insights from the policy paradigm change model in the field of public policy to elucidate this behavioral change. It argues that while Jiang Zemin’s previous policy experiences resulted in a similar accommodative response in the leadup to the crisis, when two necessary conditions became fulfilled by mid-July, Beijing’s posture changed: the lengthening of decision time and a relatively equal power relationship between the military and Jiang, that is, the erosion of Jiang’s earlier supremacy over the military.

Nuclear War and the Limits of Prudence: Christopher David LaRoche (Central European University)
Abstract: The war in Ukraine and popular culture events such as Oppenheimer and Fallout -have reminded the world that at any moment it may be obliterated in a nuclear war. Despite many "close calls," no nuclear power has employed its nuclear weapons in war since their very first use on Japan. Scholars explain this "puzzle of non-use" with reference to competing mechanisms (deterrence, taboo, or tradition), but all emphasize prudence — of JFK, for example -- as a key reason past crises did not escalate into nuclear exchanges. More recently, others argue not prudence but luck, defined as lack of control, has repeatedly saved the world from nuclear war. This paper investigates the relationship between luck and prudence in nuclear crises by reexamining their role in the Cuban Missile Crisis. It reinterprets prudence as a kind of distributive luck -- the right leader in the right moment -- that is only partially under democratic control. It argues both luck and prudence were necessary but insufficient factors in the Cuba outcome. Because both democratic and autocratic leaders face incentives to engage in imprudent crisis escalation, however, hopes that a more prudent foreign policy elite can avert future nuclear war may be misplaced.

Realism and Neutrality in Fragile States Foreign Policy: Said Yaqub Ibrahimi (Carleton University)
Abstract: Fragile states are often characterized by a lack of authority, legitimacy, and capacity. In this context, fragility impacts not only their domestic but also their foreign policy. This paper explores how fragile states can balance foreign power dynamics and shape foreign policy amidst international rivalries by drawing on defensive realism. Focusing on Afghanistan’s foreign policy during the reign of Mohammad Zahir Shah (1933-1973), this paper illustrates how neutrality effectively protected Afghanistan from foreign intervention from World War II through the Cold War until 1973. Drawing on archival and secondary sources, the paper provides a historical analysis of Afghanistan’s balanced foreign policy approach, a strategy that helped the country avoid undue dependency on regional and global powers. The findings aim to offer policy insights for Afghan policymakers and to contribute to broader discussions on the foreign policy strategies of fragile states.

Is Side-picking Inevitably An Unwise Choice？A Study of Middle Power‘s Strategy in Great Power Competition: Yanzhuo Xu (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)
Abstract: Current literatures argue that the flexible hedging strategy has become the most reasonable choice for middle powers, which helps those countries to maintain dynamics between the two great powers (US and China) while seeking profits and avoiding risks. They believed that strategic ambiguity and a neutral stance could provide more policy choices and benefits for them. In contrast the concept of “side-picking” has been neglected. Generally, the term is mainly regarded as either a passive reaction to the deteriorating great power rivalry, coercive diplomacy, limited national strength, or an expedient measure made by political elites due to values, public pressures, etc. However, these arguments could not explain the following diplomatic behaviors, first the country has chosen side with great power even if there are no direct security threats or impacts on power transition. Second, countries with strong military and economic strength appear to be "choosing sides." Middle powers have higher autonomy in decision-making, they usually do not have the “side picking” dilemma like those of small and medium countries. This research will explore why more and more middle powers start to “side-picking” by defining the concept of “side-picking”, examine the theoretical possibility of this diplomatic behavior.